EUROCONTROL Guidelines on operational response to GNSS degradations

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Abstract		
This document describes the ATM/ANS procedures for managing GNSS degradation situations. It takes into account international standards, regulations, and best practices. The document recommends practical actions to ATM/ANS providers, States, and other operational stakeholders in preparing, managing, and recovering from GNSS degradation events.		
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Director General	Raúl Medina Caballero 	03 1126

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

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EDITION NUMBER	EDITION DATE	REASON FOR CHANGE	PAGES AFFECTED
1.0	03/11/2026	First edition	All

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Purpose of the document 1
1.2. Structure of the document 1
1.3. Applicability 1
1.4. Development of the Guidelines 1
1.5. Conventions 2
1.6. Maintenance of the Guidelines 3
1.7. Definitions 3
1.8. Abbreviations 3
1.9. Reference material 4
2. EFFECTS OF GNSS DEGRADATIONS ON ATM/ANS 5
3. OPERATIONAL ATM PROCEDURES 7
3.1. Planning and Preparation 7
3.1.1. Governance framework 7
3.1.2. Risk Assessment and Mitigation Impact Analysis 8
3.1.3. Coordination with relevant parties 8
3.1.4. Monitoring of GNSS degradation 8
3.2. AIS products 9
3.3. ATS procedures 9
3.4. ATFCM procedures 11
ANNEX A – GNSS NOTAM EXAMPLE 12
ANNEX B – DOCUMENT UPDATE PROCEDURES 13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have become a critical enabler of modern Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Air Navigation Services (ANS). However, the increasing prevalence of GNSS degradations — whether due to interference, space weather or system vulnerabilities — poses risks for aviation operations.

This document provides harmonised, practical guidance to ATM/ANS providers, States, and other relevant stakeholders in preparing, managing, and recovering from GNSS degradation events. The focus is on operational ATM/ANS procedures, complementing existing provisions and national frameworks.

The Guidelines are advisory in nature and aim to promote best practices, enhance coordination, and support consistent responses across the European ATM network.

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of the document

This document provides guidance for ATM/ANS Providers, States, and other relevant stakeholders on developing and implementing national GNSS contingency and operations plans. It focuses on ATM/ANS procedures for managing GNSS degradation situations safely and effectively, referencing lessons learned and best practices from ATM/ANS providers' responses.

The main objectives of these Guidelines are:

- Safety: Ensure continued safe operations during GNSS degradations;
- Coordination: Establish clear communication among stakeholders;
- Preparedness: Develop harmonised contingency procedures;
- Resilience: Maintain operational continuity through resilient infrastructure which includes systems that are independent from GNSS

1.2. Structure of the document

This document is organised as follows:

Section 1: Introduces the Guidelines

Section 2: Describes the effects of GNSS degradation on ATM/ANS services

Section 3: Details the procedures applicable for the management of GNSS degradation events

Annex A: GNSS NOTAM Example

Annex B: Maintenance procedures for the present document

1.3. Applicability

This document is intended for ATM/ANS providers, Authorities of EUROCONTROL Member States and Comprehensive Agreement States and other relevant stakeholders (e.g airspace users, aerodrome operators).

This document covers local or regional GNSS degradations as well as situations where the root causes originated from another airspace.

1.4. Development of the Guidelines

This standard was developed by EUROCONTROL's CNS Unit in collaboration with stakeholders participating in the GNSS RFI Action Plan Task Force—the Joint EASA–EUROCONTROL Task Force—and with the relevant expert domains across the Agency. The timeline for the drafting, consultation and consideration of stakeholders' feedback is represented in the figure below:



The requirements set out in these Guidelines are based primarily on operational needs and practical experience. The document was prepared in close collaboration with Member States, ATM/ANS providers, regulators, airspace users, and other relevant stakeholders. Consultations were conducted through the GNSS RFI Action Plan Task Force, the Network Operations Team (NETOPS) and the Joint CNS Stakeholder Platform (JCSP), and the feedback received was taken into account in this first edition.

1.5. Conventions

EUROCONTROL Guidelines, as defined in EUROCONTROL Regulatory and Advisory Framework (ERAF), are advisory materials and contain:
“Any information or provisions for physical characteristic, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the use of which is recognised as contributing to the establishment and operation of safe and efficient systems and services related to ATM in the EUROCONTROL Member States.”

In addition, EUROCONTROL Regulatory and Advisory Framework specifies that “EUROCONTROL Guidelines may be used, inter alia, to support implementation and operation of ATM systems and services, and to:

- complement EUROCONTROL Rules and Specifications;
- complement ICAO Recommended Practices and Procedures;
- complement EU legislation;
- indicate harmonisation targets for ATM Procedures;
- encourage the application of best practice;
- provide detailed procedural information.”

Therefore, the application of EUROCONTROL Guidelines is **not mandatory**.

a) “Shall”[1] – indicates a required element that is necessary to meet or satisfy identified objective(s) within the EUROCONTROL Guidelines.

b) “Should” – indicates a recommended element that is not specifically required to meet or satisfy the identified objective(s).

c) “May” – indicates an optional element.

These Guidelines developed for the purpose of this document are identifiable by the prefix **GNSS-GM-x**, where x is a numerical value.

[1] Note that the use of “Shall” in these Guidelines does not refer to a mandatory requirement from a regulatory perspective, but it is used to identify those elements that must be implemented to achieve the minimum objectives of the Guidelines. It is the status of the document itself that determines whether it is mandatory or not.

Referenced documents are listed in section 1.9 and are crossed-referenced by their label **[RD x]**, where **x** is a numerical value.

Note: Requirement numbers are initially allocated incrementally in tens. This aids the subsequent management of these Guidelines allowing new requirements to be inserted between existing requirements whilst maintaining a logical number sequence.

1.6. Maintenance of the Guidelines

These EUROCONTROL[2] Guidelines have been developed under the EUROCONTROL Regulatory and Advisory Framework (ERAF) and are maintained by EUROCONTROL in accordance with this Framework; and in line with the EUROCONTROL Standards Development Procedures. The procedures are described in detail in Annex B.

1.7. Definitions

Term	Definition
GNSS degradation	It refers to a condition in which GNSS does not meet the required performances for the intended operation according to ICAO SARPS Annex 10 or published EGNOS service definition document for EGNOS. A GNSS degradation may be caused by harmful GNSS jamming and spoofing, GNSS constellation failure, loss or corruption, GPS RAIM unavailability, EGNOS or GBAS outage, space weather events, etc.
Safety	The State in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level [RD 6]
Security	Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference, achieved by a mix of measures and resources. [RD 7]

1.8. Abbreviations

ADS-B	Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast
ADS-C	Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract
AIP SUP	Aeronautical Information Publication Supplement
AIS	Aeronautical Information Services
ANS	Air Navigation Services
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATCO	Air Traffic Control Officer
ATFCM	Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management
ATIS	Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATM	Air Traffic Management
ATS	Air Traffic Services
ATSEP	Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel

[2] EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION

CPDLC	Controller–Pilot Data Link Communications
DME	Distance Measuring Equipment
EACCC	EUROCONTROL Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell
EGNOS	European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
FIR	Flight Information Region
FL	Flight Level
FMP	Flow Management Position
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HF	High Frequency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
ILS	Instrument Landing System
IRU	Inertial Reference Unit
MLAT	Multilateration
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
PBN	Performance-Based Navigation
RAIM	Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RNAV	Area Navigation
RNP	Required Navigation Performance
RFI	Radio Frequency Interference
SARPS	Standards and Recommended Practices
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SID	Standard Instrument Departure
STAR	Standard Terminal Arrival Route
TMA	Terminal Manoeuvring Area
VHF	Very High Frequency
VOLMET	Meteorological information for aircraft in flight (broadcast)
VOR	VHF Omnidirectional Range
USSP	U-Space Service Provider

1.9. Reference material

[RD 1] EUROCONTROL European GNSS Contingency/ Reversion Handbook for PBN Operations PBN HANDBOOK No. 6 Edition 1.1, 2021

[RD 2] IATA Global Navigation Satellite System GNSS Radio Frequency Interference Safety Risk Assessment, 2025

[RD3] Regulation 2017/373 ATM/ANS.OR.A.070

[RD4] EUROCONTROL. Guidelines Operating Procedures for AIS Dynamic Data (OPADD), Edition 4.1, 2020

[RD 5] ICAO Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual - (Doc 9849) 5th Edition, 2025

[RD 6] ICAO Manual on Monitoring Implementation of Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans – Doc 10162, Edition 2, 2026

[RD 7] ICAO Annex 17- Aviation Security, Edition 12, 2022

2. Effects of GNSS degradations on ATM/ANS

GNSS degradation (including spoofing) can have multiple potential impacts on different ATM/ANS services and procedures although effects are not homogenous. The table below aims to provide an understanding of potential implications of GNSS degradations without being exhaustive:

ATM/ANS services and procedures affected		Impact description
Communication	CPDLC	CPDLC unusable or unavailable due to unreliable time stamp on messages.
	ADS-C	Loss of ADS-C link (the communication use of ADS-C, where ATC sets, modifies, or demands specific data reports from the aircraft). In ADS-C surveillance only areas (e.g. oceanic or remote areas): Loss or corruption of surveillance
	VoIP communications	Loss of timing can degrade voice quality, cause dropped connections, or corrupt transmitted information. Impact depends on system design, range and alternate time sources.
Surveillance	ADS-B	Loss or corruption or degradation of ADS-B position data; In ADS-B surveillance only areas (e.g. oceanic or remote areas or in low density TMAs or airports with relatively low traffic levels): Loss or corruption of surveillance
	MLAT	Loss or corruption of GNSS time synchronisation. Impact depends on system design, range and alternate time sources.
	Radars	Loss or corruption of GNSS time synchronisation. Impact depends on system architecture and alternate time sources.
Navigation	ATS routes (including SID, STAR)	Corruption of GNSS navigation Loss of GNSS and unavailability of airways and SID/STAR based solely on GNSS[3]
	APPROACH	Corruption of GNSS navigation Loss of GNSS and unavailability of PBN procedures based solely on GNSS. Unavailability of GBAS procedures.
	Free route airspace	Corruption of GNSS navigation Loss of GNSS and unavailability of PBN based solely on GNSS
	Oceanic crossing	Corruption of GNSS navigation Inability to use the oceanic airspace if GNSS and IRU are not available (e.g. when exceeding the IRU drift threshold for the target PBN oceanic specification)

[3] The aircraft could be equipped and able to switch to non-GNSS based navigation.

Others	ATM Data-processing	Loss or corruption of GNSS time synchronisation. Impact depends on system architecture and alternate time sources.
	Remote Tower	Loss or corruption of GNSS time synchronisation. Impact depends on system architecture and alternate time sources.
	ATIS/VOLMET	Loss or corruption of GNSS time can degrade voice quality, cause dropped connections, or corrupt transmitted information. Impact depends on system architecture and alternate time sources.
	Aerodrome	Loss or corruption of GNSS time synchronisation (e.g. aerodrome operations management systems, surface radar, etc). Impact depends on system architecture and alternate time sources.

Table 1 – Effects of GNSS degradations on ATM/ANS/CNS [RD1][RD2]

3. Operational ATM procedures

3.1. Planning and Preparation

3.1.1. Governance framework

GNSS-GM-010: The State **should** establish a clear governance framework for the management of GNSS degradation events impacting air transport using existing crisis management arrangements or by creating a new one.

GNSS-GM-020: The governance framework **should**:

- Clearly define roles, responsibilities and decision-making authority across operational, technical and management functions;
- Establish transparent accountability at State level between ATM/ANS providers, and competent State authorities;
- Include escalation procedures based on predefined technical and operational impact thresholds;
- Ensure effective coordination at all levels (local, national and network/international levels), including information exchange with neighbouring States and relevant network-level actors[4] where GNSS degradation has cross-border effects;
- be developed in alignment with the existing network crisis-management arrangements to ensure interoperability, effective cross-border coordination and a harmonised network response.
- Identify responsible authorities for the initiation, coordination and termination of mitigation measures.

GNSS-GM-030: Governance arrangements **should** ensure that assessments supporting decisions when subject to GNSS degradation are carried out by appropriately trained personnel or qualified personnel for certified systems when available.

GNSS-GM-040: Simulation exercises **should** be conducted at the network level (led by the Network Manager) to verify preparedness for GNSS degradation scenarios.

GNSS-GM-050: These exercises **should**:

- Cover operational, technical and coordination aspects;
- Validate contingency and reversion procedures and fallback operational concepts;
- Assess the effectiveness of communication and escalation processes;
- Evaluate cross-border and network coordination mechanisms, where applicable.

GNSS-GM-060: The outcomes of these simulation exercises **should** be documented and incorporated into safety assurance activities and continuous improvement processes by the ATM/ANS providers.

[4] Relevant network-level actors include the Network Manager, GNSS service providers as well as any other entity that should be involved in the coordination.

3.1.2. Risk Assessment and Mitigation Impact Analysis

GNSS-GM-070: ATM/ANS providers and Aerodrome operators **shall** conduct safety and security risk assessments to identify GNSS dependencies and operational impacts of GNSS degradations, at least at two levels (national and at each ATS unit /Aerodrome).

GNSS-GM-080: Risk assessment **shall** address as a minimum:

- Identification of all GNSS-dependent procedures (e.g. RNP) and systems (e.g. ADS-B, CPDLC);
- Identification of contingency and reversion procedures and non-GNSS alternatives (DME/DME, ILS, VOR);
- Assessment of airspace and airport vulnerability to GNSS loss or degradation.
- Assessment of resilience of ground systems and subsystems in particular those using time from GNSS as reference;
- Document and regularly update contingency plans as per [RD3].

3.1.3. Coordination with relevant parties

GNSS-GM-090: ATM/ANS providers **should** establish coordination protocols with adjacent ATM/ANS providers, aerodrome operators, USSPs, GNSS service providers, military, Network Manager, radio regulators, radio frequency spectrum agencies and airspace users for information sharing in case of GNSS degradation. This includes:

- Maintaining up-to-date contact lists for stakeholders concerned;
- Defining communication channels and notification means with all concerned stakeholders;
- Defining clear criteria for the activation of national crisis management structures and EACCC notification.

GNSS-GM-100: The shared information in case of GNSS degradation **should** include at least the impacted geographical area (Sky view map or the impacted airspace volume) or a list of affected flights, the start time of the event observation.

GNSS-GM-110: The shared information **should** include, where possible, an indication of the duration, the end time and the source location.

3.1.4. Monitoring of GNSS degradation

GNSS-GM-120: ATM/ANS Providers **shall** have mean(s) allowing to recognize GNSS degradations affecting their airspace (e.g. GNSS monitoring tools[5] or reporting systems[6] or other external means coming from radio frequency spectrum agencies or Network Manager or GNSS service providers or other sources). [RD 5]

[5] No ATC-executive action can be initiated taking as sole basis the information displayed by GNSS monitoring tools unless those are compliant with the European Conformity Assessment regulatory framework.
[6] Air ground reporting is part of the reporting system.

3.2. AIS products

GNSS-GM-130: In case of expected GNSS degradation, NOTAM or other AIS products containing all relevant information to alert airspace users **shall** be prepared by the relevant state authority[7] for issuance by the AIS.

Issued NOTAM **shall** use standardised NOTAM templates for GNSS issues [RD4], include FIR, NOTAM code, traffic, purpose, scope, lower/upper limits, coordinates, radius, start/end times and recommended contingency or reversion procedures if applicable. Other AIP products can be used to provide geographical representation of impact zones for different FLs[8].

GNSS-GM-140: Following a predetermined number of consecutive pilot reports[9] or system alert indicating GNSS degradation lasting more than 15 min, NOTAM containing all relevant information to alert airspace users **shall** be issued in less than 2 hours by the relevant state authority[10]. These NOTAM **shall**:

- Use standardised NOTAM templates for GNSS degradations;
- Include FIR, NOTAM code, traffic, purpose, scope, lower/upper limits, coordinates, radius, start/end times;
- Provide impact zones for different FLs if known.

GNSS-GM-150: The trigger criteria for the NOTAM issue **shall** be defined in the preparation phase.

GNSS-GM-160: The staff issuing the NOTAM **shall** be properly trained to use the NOTAM template(s) for GNSS degradations.

GNSS-GM-170: In case of GNSS degradation (e.g. GPS RAIM, EGNOS or GBAS outage, interference testing, space weather, etc) of an expected long-term nature (three months or more) or if a NOTAM is not sufficient to describe the impacted area (e.g. explanatory graphics or extensive text are needed), an AIP SUP **should** be issued by the concerned ATM/ANS provider(s) containing all relevant information, in particular:

- Affected area(s) supported by explanatory plots;
- Dates, times and durations;
- Potentially impacted systems and the recommended contingency procedures.

3.3. ATS procedures

GNSS-GM-180: For unplanned GNSS degradations and following a predetermined number of consecutive pilot reports or system alert indicating GNSS degradation in the area of responsibility, ATCO **shall**:

- Notify the supervisor or the next higher authority;
- Notify ATSEP – unless the task is attributed to the supervisor

[7] Issuing a NOTAM is a State responsibility. However, the State can delegate the authority for the provision of the AIS to a non-governmental agency provided that the provisions in ICAO's SARPS of Annex 15 are adequately met.
[8] In case the vertical limit of the impact is not known, then the maximum impacted flight level indicated in the NOTAM should be UNL (unlimited) or the highest limit of the FIR (e.g. FL660).
[9] The number of received reports depends on local needs, safety assessment conclusions and constraints.
[10] Issuing a NOTAM is a State responsibility. However, the State can delegate the authority for the provision of the AIS to a non-governmental agency provided that the provisions in ICAO's SARPS of Annex 15 are adequately met.

GNSS-GM-190: Following the notification from ATCO of a potential GNSS degradation in the AoR, the supervisor **shall** initiate the necessary protocols and coordination processes with the actors identified within the governance framework.

GNSS-GM-200: When after following the protocols and coordination processes is ascertained that a GNSS degradation occurrence is active in the area of responsibility, the following actions **shall** be performed by the ATM/ANS providers:

- Inform pilots about potential GNSS unavailability / unreliability[11] and timing issues;
- Update ATIS/D-ATIS with information relevant to GNSS issues;
- Advise the flight crew to disconnect CPDLC and use voice communications;
- Provide directly this information to the next ATS unit (via voice or system if the function is available);
- Activate the necessary ATFCM solutions;
- Suspend the application of separation minima based on availability of GNSS if applicable and apply another form of separation, as appropriate
- Inform the national frequency manager.

GNSS-GM-210: When after following the protocols and coordination processes is ascertained that a GNSS interference occurrence is active, the national frequency manager **shall** notify the Network Manager of the unavailability of GNSS if it is or potentially affecting the network.

GNSS-GM-220: When operations are conducted in an area of declared active GNSS RFI, in addition to the recommendations above, the following actions **shall** be performed by the ATM/ANS providers:

- Provide navigation assistance when requested by the pilots including radar vectors or re-clearance via alternative flight procedures that do not rely on GNSS;
- Should the GNSS degradation be confirmed to be spoofing, consider the following:
  - Inform pilots about potential time and Datalink unavailability
  - instruct the pilot to include the information that it was spoofed in the initial call with the accepting unit
- Use voice messages via VHF or HF and increase separation for trans-Atlantic flights if SATCOM/ADS-C/ADS-B/CPDLC are impacted due to on-board timing issues;
- Aircraft unable to switch off the GNSS feed to EGPWS may experience ‘terrain, pull-up” warnings. This may cause an aircraft to initiate an unauthorized climb due to the nature of the warning. In case of aircraft climbing without authorization, inform traffic in the vicinity (including a broadcast message if considered appropriate) and endeavour prevention of separation infringements (state minimum safe altitude in the area where the pull-up manoeuvre is executed);
- Inform the supervisor for coordination with the FMP whenever the workload increases unexpectedly.

GNSS-GM-230: After verifying GNSS service restoration, the impacted ATM/ANS provider **shall** cancel NOTAMs and restore normal procedures by performing the following actions:

- Confirm end of degradation via technical means and stakeholder input;

[11] Affected aircraft may revert to DME/DME, VOR/DME, ILS, or IRS navigation.

- Define a threshold for NOTAM and/or ATIS/D-ATIS messages updating (e.g. no pilot reports, sufficient number of flights operating through the affected area without reporting GNSS degradations and no detection for the last 2 hours in a defined airspace volume or area)

GNSS-GM-240: Post event, the ATM/ANS provider **shall** conduct a review of the applied measures and update contingency procedures based on the event observations if needed.

3.4. ATFCM procedures

GNSS-GM-250: ATM/ANS provider **shall** identify the most efficient sectorisation scheme to handle the workload increase, assess the need for changes to the applicable separation minima and the need for reducing capacity[12] [13].

GNSS-GM-260: The FMP **shall** notify the NMOC of the reduced capacity and sectorisation schemes activated indicating GNSS degradation as a reason.

GNSS-GM-270: The Network Manager, together with the affected ATS units **shall** assess the impact of traffic flow circumventing the area of GNSS degradation and introduce the appropriate ATFCM solutions to balance the traffic demand with the available capacity.

GNSS-GM-280: The FMP **shall** inform NMOC about the introduced capacity changes following the GNSS degradation.

GNSS-GM-290: In the case of an unusual and unforeseen situation having a serious effect on the European aviation network (e.g drastic drop in capacity, multi-state impact), the Network Manager **shall** coordinate the response to the network crisis and the activation of contingency plans, in accordance with the EACCC Rules of Procedure, involving close cooperation with corresponding structures in Member States.

[12]Normally, the assessment of capacity is determined based on staffing and sector complexity.
[13]The recommendation is applicable not only to managing the GNSS degradation situations but also the added traffic flow in corridors circumventing the conflict zone airspaces.

ANNEX A – GNSS NOTAM EXAMPLE

Q)LRBB/QGWAU/IV/NBO/E/000/999/4501N02531E/234

A)LRBB

B)2601260701

C)2603232159

E) GNSS INTERFERENCES WERE REPORTED BY AIRCRAFT OVERFLYING THE FIR.

POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL IMPACTS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:
- PBN PROCEDURES: UNAVAILABILITY RNP1 AND RNP APPROACHES,
- CPDLC: LOSS OF CONNECTIVITY.

FLIGHT CREWS ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE CAUTION AND TO REPORT GNSS INTERFERENCE TO THE APPROPRIATE ATS UNIT.

RADAR CONTROL SERVICE, VOICE COMMUNICATION AND CONVENTIONAL NAV AIDS ARE NOT AFFECTED AND CAN BE USED.

ANNEX B – Document Update Procedures

It is necessary to periodically check these EUROCONTROL Guidelines for consistency with referenced material, notably ICAO SARPS and relevant Regulations. The Guidelines may also evolve following feedback from field experience.

The main objectives of a regular review are:

a) to improve the quality of the Guidelines (e.g. clarity, testability, etc.);

b) to verify that the level of detail published is adequate;

c) to make all stakeholders aware of the latest developments.

The update process for the guidelines is expected to be initiated by Stakeholders, who may provide change proposals either through existing working arrangements (e.g. established working groups) or by sending a formal Change Request (CR) to the generic email address: standardisation@eurocontrol.int.

The CR needs to provide, at a minimum, the following elements:

- Originator information (name, organisation, contact details);
- Guideline title, number and edition date;
- Page, chapter, section (subsection) where the issue appears;
- Description of the issue and reason for change;
- Specific change proposal text (incl. potential alternatives, if any).

Main steps towards a revised version:

- EUROCONTROL will assess each CR in coordination with content owners to establish the urgency and impact (major, minor or editorial);
- A resolution proposal will be prepared and, if needed, discussed with the originator;
- Agreed changes will be integrated into a revised “Proposed Issue” version, which includes a summary of changes in the document record;
- The “Proposed Issue” will be consulted using appropriate working arrangements.

Note: Identified errors which may cause potential problems when implementing, may be corrected directly via a separate “Corrigendum”.

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