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Primary Radar Surveillance |
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The Surveillance Strategy for ECAC foresees a migration from independent cooperative surveillance to dependent cooperative surveillance. Nevertheless, it is expected that non-cooperative independent surveillance in the form of Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) within approach and TMA airspace remains a standing requirement.
The continued use of PSR within TMA will ensure detection and tracking of non-cooperative targets i.e. aircraft not equipped with Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponders or experiencing avionics failure.
For en-route surveillance the situation is different as the principal technical solution remains dual SSR coverage not supplemented by PSR. However, in some areas, PSR has been implemented for en-route purposes based on local safety and security requirements. Some studies have identified more than 60 primary radars being used to provide ATC services within the European region. The Surveillance Strategy for ECAC has been updated in accordance, stating as a fundamental principal:
“an independent surveillance system to track non-cooperative targets in TMA and En Route airspace where and when required. This will be provided by primary radar unless and until an alternative solution is required and developed”
In addition, future ATM Security requirements may change the approach of using only SSR for en-route surveillance. Maintaining tracking of non-cooperative aircraft may become a basic ATM Security requirement. At present, only PSR (and wide area multi-lateration in limited areas) can provide for this.
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Surveillance Strategy for ECAC |
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In accordance with the EUROCONTROL Radar Surveillance Standard, the radar coverage required to support both terminal and en-route air traffic services shall be:
- duplicated SSR coverage for en-route airspace
- duplicated SSR coverage and single PSR cover for major terminal area
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In despite of these standards, some nations have already decided to implement PSR for en-route airspace as well, due to security and safety considerations.
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EUROCONTROL Standard Document for radar surveillance in en-route airspace and major terminal areas |
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During the 9/11 attacks, the terrorist had switched off the aircraft transponders to make them invisible to ATC centres. To cope with this situation in the future several initiatives were taken:
- EUROCONTROL, in close co-operation with NATO, presented to ICAO four strategic initiatives. The first one being: ‘establish processes to optimise the sharing of civil ATC and military ATC/Air Defence radar information’
- The EUROCONTROL Provisional Council approved the ATM Security Policy Guidance. Maintaining awareness is considered as one of the main issues. Should the activity of a particular aircraft appear suspicious, it will be essential to maintain track of that aircraft.
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To enable this, there may be a requirement to supplement secondary surveillance radar information with active or passive sensor information.
Consequently, maintaining primary radar coverage and radar data exchange between civil and military ATC centres should be promoted.
In accordance with the ATM Security Policy Guidance a number of technical improvements to enhance air navigation security must be considered. These may include reconsideration, in some instances, of current planning for decommissioning civil and military ATC primary radar, and the need for better radar data exchange between civil and military facilities. The implementation of secure and direct lines of communication should also be considered.
The NATO-EUROCONTROL ATM Security Co-ordinating Group (NEASCOG) includes the following actions:
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- Assess a high level requirement for the civil ATC controller to keep track of aircraft information under any circumstances
- Assess the EUROCONTROL Surveillance Standards to address PSR or other non-cooperative means in en-route airspace
- Review and exercise current civil/military ATC procedures and recommend, as appropriate, amendments or new procedures
- Study measures to maintain aircraft position information:
1) Review the feasibility of radar exchange taking into account the implementation of Mode S SSR.
2) Assess radar coverage in Europe.
3) Assess modalities for maintaining aircraft tracking.
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Action 2) of the last bullet is completed, and the results indicate a potential benefit in rationalising and sharing civil and military PSR coverage. Once the rest of the actions are completed some recommendations will be proposed in line with the Policy Guidance. These recommendations may be subject of standardisation or regulation if appropriate.
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PSR within the context of rationalising the CNS infrastructure |
In its “Civil-Military CNS/ATM Interoperability Roadmap”, the EUROCONTROL Military Team has identified PSR as one of the military assets that needs to be considered when synergies between civil and military organisations progress towards the rationalisation and de-fragmentation of national CNS resources.
Within this context, the EUROCONTROL Agency has been tasked by the Civil-Military Interface Standing Committee (CMIC) to initiate work, starting with the “Use of Military Primary Radars for ATM Purposes”. The EUROCONTROL “Guidelines for the Use of Military Surveillance facilities” will be used as background material.
The Final Report of the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Committee study "The Impact of Fragmentation in European ATM/CNS" provides an excellent basis to establish the order of magnitude of the benefits that can be gained from measures to reduce fragmentation in the European ATM/CNS system where PSR was identified as one of the infrastructures to consider. Overprovision and excess coverage, especially at national boundaries, could be avoided if civil and military Air Navigation Service Providers would jointly plan coverage and reduce fragmentation.
Studies carried out jointly by NATO and EUROCONTROL show that several European nations would benefit from the provision of military primary radar information to augment civil air picture and hence to support ATC in handling aircraft that are not visible to secondary radar.
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Guidelines for the Use of Military Surveillance Facilities |
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Detection and tracking of non-cooperative flying objects within the airspace of responsibility will still be required. Until an alternative technologies emerges and become mature (i.e. wide area multi-lateration), this can only be achieved using PSR.
Military PSR coverage is rather extensive. This is equally true for civil PSR coverage in some countries. Furthermore, civil and military PSR coverage could complement each other.
This way a more overall PSR coverage could be achieved by sharing civil and military radar data in line with EUROCONTROL Strategic Objective on ATM Security. By sharing this information not only security and safety will be increased but enhanced levels of civil/military co-operation and co-ordination will be reached as well.
Consequently, an initiative is much required to initiate safety and security assessments to support the requirement for a continued use of PSR not only within TMA but also for en-route.
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Antonio
NOGUERAS
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Expert
- DCMAC / HS
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| Email:
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| Phone : |
+32.2.729.4669 |
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Last validation: 14/03/2007
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