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Quantum Cryptography |
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Evaluation of Air Ground telecommunication security and its enhancement using Quantum Cryptography technology |
Ecole nationale supérieure des télécommunications
Network & Computer Science department
46 rue Barrault, 75013 Paris, France.
Web: http://www.enst.fr
Represented by:
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Michel
Riguidel
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head of department
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| Email:
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| Phone : |
33 (0) 1 45 81 78 70 (secr.) |
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The objective of the study is related to the security of Air-Ground Telecommunications (AGT) in the dangerous after 9/11 world where one may expect serious threats to aircraft safety. We may be concerned by attack on confidentiality, integrity and availability of telecommunications. A wrong message or the absence of message may have strong consequences for aircraft safety. Eavesdropping attempt may inform ill-intentioned actors. These cold facts plead for a permanent search of a maximal AGT security.
As we know, most communications are based on Very High Frequency, i.e. VHF, and technical data are transmitted using VHF Data Link (VDL) Mode-2 provided by Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC) which may be replaced in the future by VDL Mode-4. And we know that Eurocontrol Research Center (EEC) is developping and Aeronautical Communication Technologies Simulators (ACTS).
Quantum Cryptography (QC). QC is an emerging technology that could, in a few years provide a totally secure Internet architecture. ENST is currently involved in a European IT project which aim is to design specialized Internet optic fiber architecture and protocols based on QC. The main point is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) that allows a totally secure transmission of a crypting key. Experimental QKD exists using optic fiber over 70 km. Another possible application field is (air) space telecommunications.
A few works have been conducted in Europe and US. Our study is concerned about the feasability of a QC based laser-based secure QKD for AGP from the point of view of existing technology and about the design of specialized communications protocols.
We propose to study the usage of QC to secure AGT.
QC is based on a totally secure Quantum Key Distribution. A crypting key is distributed using quantic properties of particles, e.g. the polarization of a photon. Any intrusion of a third party is detected by a modification of the error rate. The corner stone of QC is Heisenberg principle of uncertainty that implies that the quantic state of a particle cannot be duplicated and that any observation by an eavesdropper eventually destroys the quantic state.
Nowadays, we can realize QKD using optic fiber on a distance of 70 km and devices exist and can be bought, cf. http://www.idquantique.com. ENST is involved in an European IT project for securing an optic fiber based Internet. Similar projects are funded and conducted in USA.
There exist scientific articles mentioning the possibility of QKD using laser between a ground station and a low earth orbit satellite (800 km) at kilo baud rate. Other articles, especially in USA, mention the possibility of daylight and night Quantum Key Distribution over 10km based on laser emission.
A similar laser-based system can be imagined for the automatic and totally secure exchange of crypting key between aircraft and Air Traffic Control station to secure AGT. The work that we propose can be described as follows:
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Bibliographical study: we must explore the literature and contact the main researchers on the subject in order to determine the feasibility of AGT QKD and what the constraints are. What technology has to be used? How many kilograms must be loaded in aircraft for the devices supporting AGP QKD? in what conditions? What are the aircraft subjects to be equipped? What are the ground equipments necessary to support AGP QKD? What is the maximum distance at which AGT QKD is feasible? What must be the ground architecture of the AGP QKD network?
Protocol design: after the bibliographical study, we must theoretically design a protocol for secure communication. This is because QKD technology is evolving fast but the technology without the network layer of protocols is useless.
Such a protocol must include operations dedicated to the hardware since quantic hardware is not 100% reliable. It must provide authentification in order to avoid man-in-the-middle attack. It must provide secure communications all over European sky. We must answer questions such as: does an aircraft get a unique Quantum key when it enters the European sky or does it must get a new key
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Last validation: 15/03/2007
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